Tuesday, March 25, 2014

Conservatism and Libertarianism: Some Thoughts on James Miller's Defense of Conservatism

James E. Miller, the culturally conservative libertarian anarchist and prolific author, argued in a recent article that libertarians should not ditch conservatism, in response to libertarian writer Chris Rossini's suggestion that conservatism should be ditched.

He argued that conservatives and libertarians are allies (though not exactly through the same "natural allies" argument used as of old).

First, the start was David Brooks's article in USA Today arguing that social welfare statismt is compatible with conservatism, and that conservatives should be like liberals and become part of the "social justice" phenomenon (which has taken various forms in the Christian community). Chris Rossini effectively responded to the pro-state arguments of Brooks, and Rossini then argued that libertarianism and conservatism should not always be together, echoing the Catholic anarcho-capitalist Lew Rockwell's argument that there comes a time in every freedom lover's life that he should detach himself from conservatism.

James Miller, however, does not seem to think that is the case. While he is opposed to the modern conservative support for war, government, crony capitalism, and banks, and while he can't exactly be considered a conservative himself ("Old-style conservativism is traditionally in favor of a restrained foreign policy. On other issues however, it concedes to aggression"), he does feel that conservatism, as it is not strictly confined to political philosophy, can be matched together with libertarianism. The purpose of this article, then, is not to condemn moral values but to show that conservatism is not compatible with libertarianism, and that it is right for libertarians to detach themselves from conservatism (though this is not to condemn conditional and temporary alliances with them).

How Do We Define Conservatism?

The definition of conservatism is important before one can enter fully into a discussion of conservative-libertarian relations. The word "conservative" usually means holding to traditional values and being wary of change (though not entirely hostile to it). It can mean "sober or conventional" or whatnot. In polity, conservatism means a policy that favors the promotion of tradition through the State, and while conservatives may disagree as to what degree traditional institutions should be promoted by the State, but ultimately conservative polity is about government promoting morality and not merely limiting itself to defending life, liberty and property. Conservative polity can in essence be considered a moral activist program for government that is not entirely in line with the libertarian insistence on the non-aggression axiom and opposition to enforced and coerced morals.

Chris Rossini, in his rebuttal to conservative "social justice" activism, sees conservatism as not all that different from leftism, and I agree in the sense that both political ideologies advocate statism and activism, only in differing forms.

James E. Miller, coming to the defense of conservatism, contrasts conservatism and libertarianism by saying, "The latter [libertarianism] is a political philosophy while the former is something of much more complexity and breadth [conservatism]." On the surface level I agree, for social and cultural conservatives can be libertarians, provided that they stick to the non-aggression principle, oppose victimless-crime laws due to a consistent limited-government/libertarian philosophy and reject interventionism in foreign affairs. And libertarianism does not equal socially liberal values and does not need to be made "thick," despite what some libertarians or non-libertairans will have you believe.

But the real issue with libertarian objections to conservatism is not so much to conservatism as an abstract theory as it is political conservatism, the use of force to enforce conservative values. Many libertarians who hold to socially and/or culturally conservative mores and advocate for them hold the same view too, and Murray Rothbard, himself no social liberal, was a critic of political conservatism and found it to be incompatible with libertarianism. In his critique of John Hosper's pro-war theory, he said this: "Between Conservatism and Libertarianism there are numerous and grave inner contradictions, and the attempt to mix the two will lead inevitably to grave problems and anomalies." So, the objection is really to the conservative advocacy of forced morality, not morality or traditional values per se (though some libertarians do take it to this extreme). 

James Miller later goes on to say:


Conservatism, at its best, is the wisdom to be suspicious of grand proclamations of the state’s efficacy. But it also extends further: it’s a disposition that recognizes man’s flawed abilities and doesn’t heartily celebrate progress, whether it be material, scientific, or knowledgeable. It holds onto tradition because of the guiding light it has provided for centuries before. That doesn’t mean a conservative is correct to oppose all new declarations of liberty. But it acts as a strong bulwark against the insidious longings of thought leaders who want tyrannical lordship over freedom.

This may be true for some conservatives, but political conservatism is essentially a pretentious philosophy, using moral principles and skepticism for all declarations of progress as a basis to attack libertarian principles in the name of "morality." Political conservatives often put faith in the State as a locus of morality, and it perverts tradition (which may or may not be good) and uses it as a reason to support an institutionalized institution of aggression and exploitation. The conservative is not merely a traditionalist (in fact, libertarians can be strong traditionalists) but rather a statist as well. 

The libertarian historian Ralph Raico says of conservatives in his response to a conservative scholar:

A final aspect of van den Haag’s attack deserves extended comment. It is an old conservative swindle, going back to Edmund Burke. It has been customary for conservatives to lay claim to our whole social inheritance of traditions, meanwhile asserting that libertarians — or classical liberals, or French philosophes — are aiming at the total destruction of all tradition. In that time-honored spirit, van den Haag states: "Libertarians are antinomians, i.e., opposed to law and traditional institutions … Libertarianism is opposed to all conservative traditions, to tradition itself” (emphasis added). 
Now, I must confess that when I read this, I was filled with astonishment. Can this really be true? Are we really such barbarians? After all, there are many different sorts of traditions; many of them obviously desirable. Can libertarians actually want to destroy all of them? Are libertarians looking forward, for instance, to the day when the tradition of cello-playing finally dies out? When literary critics no longer give a damn for the life of the English language? When friends no longer help each other out in trouble, or celebrate a marriage or the birth of a child? Are we all gleefully anticipating the moment when the last practitioner of French cuisine expires in bitterness and despair? (As far as that last one goes, I have to say, No way! I happen to know all of the top libertarians, and I’ve never met a group more sincerely appreciative of good food, and especially of French cuisine.) All of these represent traditions; and the cello-haters have yet to emerge as an important faction within the movement. So, when van den Haag says that we oppose "tradition itself," what can he mean? 
It soon becomes clear what it is that troubles van den Haag, as it troubles other conservatives. Under libertarianism, he complains, "Society is denied the ability to impose or even publicly cultivate norms and bonds. Only individuals and private groupings can do so" (emphasis added). For conservatives, on the other hand, he says, "institutions form a social order, ultimately articulated and defended in essential respects by the state, through the monopoly of legitimate coercive power exercised by its government." 
Well, as you can see — things are becoming a little clearer. It isn’t after all "tradition itself" that van den Haag is defending against the Visigothic hordes of the libertarian movement. Nor does he really believe that we want to deny the right of non-governmental groups publicly to cultivate social norms — no libertarian would use force, for instance, to prevent Jehovah’s Witnesses from renting Yankee Stadium. What worries van den Haag is that, with the growing influence of our movement, coerced, state-en forced traditions are now threatened and may not survive.


In choosing political or social positions, two alternatives have been offered: custom or tradition on the one hand, the use of reason to discern natural laws and rights on the other; in short, tradition, or the use of reason to discern abstract principles on which to stand one's ground outside the customs of time and place. Here, too, is a profound difference between traditionalist and libertarian. The traditionalist is at bottom an empiricist, distrusting rational abstraction and principle, and wrapping himself in the custom of his particular society. The libertarian, as Lord Acton stated, "wishes for what ought to be, irrespective of what is." Or, as Gertrude Himmelfarb has summed up Acton's viewpoint, "the past was allowed no authority except as it happened to conform to morality."

Also he says:

Are there any other obeisances that libertarians may properly make to tradition? Simply to say that, in life, not all questions are matters of moral principle. There are numerous areas of life where people live by habit and custom, where the custom can neither be called moral or immoral, and where pursuit of custom eases the tensions of social life and makes for a more comfortable and harmonious society. It would be a false and perverted rationalism to say that any custom which cannot be proven on some other ground to be "rational" must go by the board. We can then conclude as follows: (a) that custom must be voluntarily upheld and not enforced by coercion; and (b) that people would be well advised (although not forced) to begin with a presumption in favor of custom, other things being equal. In a world, for example, where every man takes off his hat in the presence of ladies, an individual should be free not to do so, but at the risk of being generally judged a boor. If, on the other hand, this person's constitution is such that he would be likely to suffer a bad cold by exposing his pate, then we have here a higher moral consideration overriding the social harmonies of custom.

The fact that conservatives are often supporters of statism should make one think twice before considering a conservative-libertarian alliance, because the conservative philosophy is rooted in a markedly different philosophy (statism) and the libertarian philosophy (liberty) is not the same as the conservative philosophy.

Later on, Miller states:


The conservative cause isn’t to eschew every new idea or technological innovation because it threatens a way of life ingrained in society over the course of a few millennia. It says that we will forever be flawed beings, and that caution should be intertwined with prudence. Libertarians who desire true human liberty would be naïve to immediately accept any kind of change because it comes off as freeing. If freedom is precious, it should be treated as such and not taken for granted.

I understand that the conservative ideology as Miller describes is perfectly compatible with libertarianism's non-aggression principle. But the political conservative ideal is just that: rejection of any ideal that doesn't subscribe to their statist ideals of coerced morality and statism as a locus for moral value. While libertarianism shouldn't accept every single change, it doesn't mean that we should jump on the conservative bandwagon. There is a happy balance: treating freedom as precious and being skeptical of statist changes while accepting any change in the direction of liberty and freedom from the State. 

So, while I do appreciate skepticism of certain reforms, it is my conclusion that libertarianism and conservatism are both compatible and incompatible. If conservatism is social and cultural conservatism, then it is compatible with libertarianism. However, if conservatism branches out into political conservatism, then it becomes incompatible with libertarianism and should be discarded as such.

I would like to close with Lew Rockwell's words here:
What does conservatism today stand for? It stands for war. It stands for power. It stands for spying, jailing without trial, torture, counterfeiting without limit, and lying from morning to night.
There comes a time in the life of every believer in freedom when he must declare, without any hesitation, to have no attachment to the idea of conservatism.

Letter of Liberty News Edition (3-25-2014)

Here is the Tuesday News Edition of Letter of Liberty.

Ron Paul argues that U. S. government funding of democracy is actually hurting democracy.

Phil Girardi explains the bipartisan delusion of foreign policy idiocy.

Michael Rozeff: Who was more aggressive? Putin on Crimea or Bush I on Panama?

Ryan McMaken gives a libertarian analysis of the recent Venetian secession.

Robert Wenzel exposes Koch-funded attacks on Ron Paul.

Left-secessionist Kirkpatrick Sale explains the permanent warfare mindset.

William Grigg reflects on the sufferings of compliant Mark Byrge.

M. D. Creekmore: How to prepare your home before a bug-out.

Chris Hedges explains the moral courage of Edward Snowden.

Joseph Mercola celebrates the new wave of butter consumption.

Tom Woods and Robert Murphy discuss climate change and slavery.

Robert Murphy shows how government wrecks the economy.

Richard Ebeling looks further on the issue of individualism and nationalism with respect to the Ukranian/Russian situation.

Robert Wenzel comments on the libertarian rift over Ukraine,

Wendy McElroy explains the profound libertarianism of the Baptist minister Roger Williams.

Scott Horton interviews Sheldon Richman and discusses imperialism.

Alice Slater gives her tips for a new 21st century foreign policy for America.

Ian McDougall explains the right to silence thy cellphone.

Hillary Matfess: Sanctioning Russia will only make things worse.

Norman Pollack exposes American government hypocrisy regarding Russia

Logan Albright exposes the unemployment mirage.

JIm Bovard explains Egypt's new Waco-esque model of justice.

Mexico's drug war is affecting American cities as well, argues the editorial board of the Montgomery County Courier.

Conor Friedersdorf exposes some very brutal details the CIA doesn't want you to know.

Russia Today looks back at NATO's "humanitarian" invasion of Yugoslavia.


Norman Horn Publishes My Anarcho-Capitalism Article

Norman Horn, host of the great blog Libertarian Christians and new Facebook friend of mine, was kind enough to link to my piece which explained anarcho-capitalism.

He said of me personally:

My friend Anand Venigalla is a young Christian man with a great desire to learn about and explain Christian libertarian ideas. He now runs a website called Letter of Liberty where he blogs regularly.
Anand is also a regular LCC reader and commenter, and I am very happy to share his recent post explaining anarcho-capitalism from a Christian perspective. For one so young, Anand clearly has an excellent grasp of Christian libertarian thinking.
Please do visit his website, which is wonderful. Thank you very much, Norman. :- )

My Blog Is Mentioned Elsewhere

Dear readers of Letter of Liberty:

Two good libertarian bloggers, both Calvinists and anarcho-capitalists, have been so kind as to link to my blog on their blogrolls.

C. Jay Engel of The Reformed Libertarian has been kind enough to mention my blog on his list of libertarian sites at the bottom of the main page.

And Henry Moore of The Libertarian Liquidationist has also been kind enough to list my blog on the sidebar of the main page as well as the blogroll in the "Other Great Blogs" Section.

BTW, I have a new Facebook account. You can follow me there as well, and I will post there when each blog post of mine is finished.

Thursday, March 20, 2014

Book Review: THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY by Murray N. Rothbard

The Ethics of Liberty (1982) by Murray Rothbard; with intro. by Hans-Hermann Hoppe
New York, New York; New York Univeristy Press; 1998 (republication); 1982 (Humanities Press)
308 pages; including bibliography and index
ISBN: 0-8147-7506-3
ISBN-10: 0814775594
ISBN-13978-0814775592
Dewey Decimal: 323.44'01--ddl
Library of Congress Classification: JC585 .R69 1982

*****/5

REVIEW: A Masterpiece of Thought and Political Philosophy

Murray Rothbard (1926-1995) was an interesting figure, a polymath skilled in economic theory, political and ethical philosophy, and libertarianism. He defended the libertarian message so clearly and consistently, supported sound economics in the vein of the Austrian school of economics, and was basically the towering leader of the modern libertarian movement. Without Rothbard, the libertarian movement would be very different. He applied the libertarian message consistently, not shying away from the radical elements but embracing them and defending them. And not only that, he was all around a great man. He was no god, and he had faults like any other man, but he was a great philosopher and economist and historian. His work, along with the works of Ludwig von Mises and the classical-liberal and libertarian traditions, should be recognized more and appreciated.

After finishing Rothbard's 1973 classic For A New Liberty, a crystal-clear and beautiful apologia for the libertarian creed, I have decided to embark on his 1982 masterpiece The Ethics of Liberty, a systematic outline of libertarian law and theory, looking at it from the ethical and moral perspective, as well as from a philosophical and logical standpoint. While it is not a Christian work in that it does not refer to Christianity, it is definitely not only compatible with the Christian faith but in many ways harkens back to it in its profound principles, from its attacking of mere utilitarianism and defense of natural law to the defense of justice and liberty, applying libertarian principles radically and logically, all for the enrichment and the rewarding of the thoughtful reader. While most libertarians would accept the foundational principle of self-ownership on which Rothbard bases his political philosophy, few understand the power of radical application of this principle.

The first part of this book (Introduction to Natural Law) deals with the foundation of libertarian theory, and Rothbard chooses natural law theory and natural rights as his basis, seeing it as moral and ethical. He uses the principle to defend the right of self-ownership and the libertarian/natural rights of mankind. While his philosophy is not strictly religious, it is definitely compatible with the Scriptures in that, even while Rothbard doesn't acknowledge God, he does recognize the natural law that God reveals himself through (Romans 1:19-20). Even while his theory is rationalist in orientation, the theory is not anti-religious or anti-Christian but echoing of past Christian scholars and defenders of natural law and natural rights. He even shows that natural law is not "conservative" but rather radical and revolutionary, particularly in the libertarian forum.

The second part (A Theory of Liberty) applies the natural-law libertarian foundation to construct the libertarian theory, starting with the classical Crusoe model that was used by classical economists and showing how the libertarian principles of self-ownership, the homestead principle, and freedom would work with the case of Robinson Crusoe before going on to apply it to difficult and various situations. Rothbard says of man's needs and his desire to fulfill them:


Crusoe, then, has manifold wants which he tries to satisfy, ends
that he strives to attain. Some of these ends may be attained with minimal
ef-fort on his part; if the island is so structured, he may be able to pick
edible berries off nearby bushes. In such cases, his "consumption" of a
good or service may be obtained quickly and almost instantaneously.
But for almost all of his wants, Crusoe fids that the natural world about
him does not satisfy them immediately and instantaneously; he is not, inshort, in a Garden of Eden. To achieve his ends, he must, as quickly and
productively as he can, take the nature-given resources and transform
them into useful objects, shapes, and places most useful to him-so that
he can satisfy his wants. 
In short, he must (a) choose his goals; (b) learn how to achieve them
by using nature-given resources; and then (c) exert his labor energy to
transform these resources into more useful shapes and places: i-e., into
"capital goods,"and finally into "consumer goods" that he can directly
consume. Thus, Crusoe may build himself, out of the given natural raw
materials, an axe (capital good) with which to chop down trees, in order
to construct a cabin (consumer good). Or he may build a net (capital good)
with which to catch fish (consumer good). In each case, he employs his
learned technological knowledge to exert his labor effort in transforming
land into capital goods and eventually into consumer goods. This process
of transformation of land resources constitutes his "production." In short,
Crusoe must produce before he can consume, and so that he may consume. 

And by this process of production, of transformation, man shapes and
alters his nature-given environment to his own ends, instead of,
animal-like, being simply determined by that environment.
And so man, not having innate, instinctive, automatically acquired
knowledge of his proper ends, or of the means by which they can be
achieved, must learn them, and to learn them he must exercise his powers
of observation, abstraction, thought: in short, his reason. Reason is man's
instrument of knowledge and of his very survival; the use and expansion
of his mind, the acquisition of knowledge about what is best for him and
how he can achieve it, is the uniquely human method of existence and of
achievement. And this is uniquely man's nature; man, as Aristotle pointed
out, is the rational animal, or to be more precise, the rational being.
Through his reason, the individual man observes both the facts and ways
of the external world, and the facts of his own consciousness, including
his emotions: in short, he employs both extraspection and introspection. (pp. 29-30)


After giving a brilliant take on how the free society and freedom will work in Crusoe's situation, Rothbard goes on to apply the theory of libertarianism and self-ownership to develop a corpus of the libertarian system, first applying it to the theory of property rights and just homesteading and then going on to apply that to the other issues, ranging from property and criminality, land reform, land theft, self-defense and punishment theory to the issues of bribery, children's rights, and the problem of knowledge, as well as other issues. I didn't always agree with Rothbard, especially with the issue of abortion (though I believe that a true Christian can hold Rothbard's pro-choice view on abortion and the law), but I agree with everything else Rothbard defends and affirms, including the children's rights theory Rothbard defends (with some of my own reservations). Logic and natural law are part and parcel of Rothbard's defense of liberty and libertarianism.

The third part of the book (The State versus Liberty) goes on to deal with the problem of the State, and how libertarian theory applied consistently precludes the very existence of the State, which is originated in political means, the use of exploitation and initiation of force to exist and gain wealth. He not only refutes the statist myths but also refutes the objections of even limited-government libertarians who see a role for the State in society. Rothbard says:
But, above all, the crucial monopoly is the State's control of the use
of violence: of the police and armed services, and of the courts-the locus
of ultimate decision-making power in disputes over crimes and contracts.
Control of the police and the army is particularly important in enforcing
and assuring all of the State's other powers, including the all-important
power to extract its revenue by coercion.

For there is one crucially important power inherent in the nature of
the State apparatus. All other persons and groups in society (except for
acknowledged and sporadic criminals such as thieves and bank robbers)
obtain their income voluntarily: either by selling goods and services to
the consuming public, or by voluntary gift (e.g., membership in a club or
association, bequest, or inheritance). Only the State obtains its revenue
by coercion, by threatening dire penalties should the income not be forthcoming. 
That coercion is known as "taxation," although in less regularized
epochs it was often known as "tribute." Taxation is theft, purely and simply
even though it is theft on a grand and colossal scale which no acknowledged
criminals could hope to match. It is a compulsory seizure of the
property of the State's inhabitants, or subjects. (p. 162)

He also goes on to show that the State can't own property but only exploits and takes it from others and owns it outside the bounds of just property titles. And he shows how immoral the State is and why it can't exist within a just and proper society, the libertarian society. He even makes the argument that the services that the state provides can be provided in a more just and a more workable manner in the stateless libertarian society, reminiscent of his work For A New Liberty. Also worthwhile are his words on voting and foreign policy, in which he brings a consistent application of the libertarian principles to these tough issues. His perspective is worth considering and even worth embracing.

And the fourth and final parts of the book (Modern Alternative Theories of Liberty and Toward a Theory of Strategy for Liberty) are also valuable in that the fourth section refutes alternative theories that don't reflect natural rights and/or a consistent libertarianism. He critiques Isaiah Berlin for his anti-libertarian theories, attacks F. A. Hayek's faulty definition of coercion, and even critiques his great mentor Ludwig von Mises for adopting utilitarianism and attempting to apply a "value-free" perspective on political philosophy. And the final section is fair and balanced, keeping principles in mind while welcoming any goal, however mild, that defends the cause of liberty. He rejects both opportunism on the right-wing and sectarianism on the left-wing but prefers a moral-pragmatic strategy in which the moral ideal of a pure libertarian society is held up and the pragmatic strategy is allowed which does not contradict the goal.

Also encouraging is Rothbard's optimism and hope for a bright and free future, which, while I don't hold to as highly as Rothbard does, is very inspiring.

Overall, whether or not one agrees with this book's philosophy, The Ethics of Liberty is worth a read by all thoughtful people and all thoughtful libertarians, and I am glad that I spent my time doing so. I will be writing in the future on specific parts of this book, and I will be sure to revisit this book and re-read it, not only to catch what I may have missed when I first read it but also to learn more and to be even more enriched.

Tuesday, March 18, 2014

Letter of Liberty News Edition (3-18-2014)

Here is the Tuesday Edition of Letter of Liberty

John Cochran explains why GDP measuring leads to more government. Jonathan Goodwin also builds up on Cochran's analysis.

James E. Miller argues that conservatism shouldn't be ditched.

Hunter Lewis gives his thoughts on Obama's new Fed appointees.

Laurence Vance exposes the craziness of anti-discrimination legislation, especially in the strange form it has taken.

Richard Ebeling distinguishes Ukranian and Russian nationalism from self-determination and individualism.

Bill Sardi argues for the use of garlic as a medicine.

Jim Sinclair argues that sanctioning Russia is a very big mistake.

John Whitehead gives his thoughts on the Second Amendment and makes a civil libertarian case for gun rights.

Russia Today reports on Venetian secession from Italy and Roman domination. 

Ron Paul argues for equality under natural law in his analysis of new surveillance-related complaints.

Michael Rozeff argues against the folly of Obama's sanctions and argues against making Crimea's referendum illegal.

Ron Paul makes the case for non-intervention with regards to the recent Crimean secession.

Eric Owens analyses the call to jail the deniers of climate change theory by a professor. Tom DiLorenzo also gives some thoughts.

Jack Douglas looks at the Russia-Ukraine situation.

Daisy Luther looks at terror drills and public schooling (and why they are a bad idea).

Gaye Levy and Joe Alton give their tips on survivial medicine.

Elizabeth Renter: Napping is good for you.

Brandon Engel: Is Google a friend or enemy of liberty?

Pat Buchanan: Is Putin really irrational?

Phil Girardi gives his thoughts on Ukraine.

Kevin Carson reviews The End of Power, a book by Moises Naím.

Jacob Hornberger exposes the Argentinian government inflation scam.

Sheldon Richman contrasts liberty and warfare statism.

Gene Healy looks at the disaster that is the U. S. government's intervention in Libya.

Jack Matlock analyzes U. S. war policy since the end of the Cold War.

David Shellenberg: Tear down free trade barriers uniaterally!

Dan Froomkin reports on the alleged death of a license-tracking device and why reports may be exaggerated.

Kurt Schmoke: The drug war is futile and only grown more so.

Kelly Vlahos gives some thoughts on Afghanistan based on a "surge skeptic."

Winston Wheeler looks at America's trillon-dollar national security budget.


Monday, March 17, 2014

Happy St. Patrick's Day

Happy St. Patrick's Day, everybody!

For today, I would like to note St. Patrick's Day is the celebration of the great saint St. Patrick, the Irish Catholic minister who led many to Christ and who successfully abolished slavery and the slave trade in Ireland (without starting a mass Civil War, like what happend in America).

The Anarchist Notebook, a new and great blog, says in its article:
It’s sad that St. Patrick’s Day is more known for big parades and wearing green and over-consuming liquor and beer. It’d be far better if it celebrated his greatest achievements that included the eradication of slavery – the worst violation of the Non-Aggression Principle. And unlike America, he managed to do it without resorting to violence in any way. 
In fact, Ireland is an anomaly in that its conversion to Christianity was marked by the absence of violence.  Not a single Christian was martyred or killed for their faith while they were converting the pagan Irish. This gave rise to a phenomenon known as “white martyrdom” in which Irishman totally committed their lives to God and “died a living death” in a spiritual sense. 
St. Patrick should be remembered if for no other reason than the fact that he proved the Non-Aggression Principle works and can be implemented if people are willing to embrace it.

Also interesting is that Ireland is an example of a successful anarchist society (before Oliver Cromwell conquered it), which proves that society doesn't need the State to manage itself.  Christian anarcho-capitalist Henry Moore, host of The Libertarian Liquidationist, gives some thoughts on this in his article today
The one thing I would like to get out of the way is a definition of “Anarchy”. Etymologically, we know that “anarchy” simply means “without rule”, where “rule” refers to the reign of a ruler or the establishment of some other hierarchical political order. It does not mean, nor does it imply, “without rules.” Nor “chaos.” or “violence.” Rules can be (and usually are, even many of those that are eventually codified by legislation) mere customs which themselves are the result of competition between different ideas for how problems might best be solved. Tradition is very often the result of countless centuries of trial and error of which ideas and methods do and do not work. Legislation, on the other hand, is very often the result of the arbitrary or hubristic wills of so few imposed upon so many. Chaos and violence are part of the human condition, but they can be mitigated through competition, exchange, and voluntary cooperation, whereas intervention and threats of force create strong reactions, perverse incentives, and economic uncertainty, thereby exacerbating the situation. 
The great theorist Murray Rothbard himself, in his classic book For A New Liberty, had some interesting things to say about the Irish society and how it relates to libertarianism (audio available here): 
The most remarkable historical example of a society of libertarian law and courts, however, has been neglected by historians until very recently. And this was also a society where not only the courts and the law were largely libertarian, but where they operated within a purely state-less and libertarian society. This was ancient Ireland — an Ireland which persisted in this libertarian path for roughly a thousand years until its brutal conquest by England in the seventeenth century. And, in contrast to many similarly functioning primitive tribes (such as the Ibos in West Africa, and many European tribes), preconquest Ireland was not in any sense a “primitive” society: it was a highly complex society that was, for centuries, the most advanced, most scholarly, and most civilized in all of Western Europe. For a thousand years, then, ancient Celtic Ireland had no State or anything like it. As the leading authority on ancient Irish law has written: ”There was no legislature, no bailiffs, no police, no public enforcement of justice….There was no trace of State-administered justice.” 
How then was justice secured? The basic political unit of ancient Ireland was the tuath. All “freemen” who owned land, all professionals, and all craftsmen, were entitled to become members of a tuath. Each tuath’s members formed an annual assembly which decided all common policies, declared war or peace on other tuatha, and elected or deposed their “kings.” An important point is that, in contrast to primitive tribes, no one was stuck or bound to a given tuath, either because of kinship or of geographical location. Individual members were free to, and often did, secede from a tuath and join a competing tuath. Often, two or more tuatha decided to merge into a single, more efficient unit. As Professor Peden states, “the tuath is thus a body of persons voluntarily united for socially beneficial purposes and the sum total of the landed properties of its members constituted its territorial dimension.” In short, they did not have the modern State with its claim to sovereignty over a given (usually expanding) territorial area, divorced from the landed property rights of its subjects; on the contrary, tuatha were voluntary associations which only comprised the landed properties of its voluntary members. Historically, about 80 to 100 tuatha coexisted at any time throughout Ireland. 
But what of the elected “king”? Did he constitute a form of State ruler? Chiefly, the king functioned as a religions high priest, presiding over the worship rites of the tuath, which functioned as a voluntary religious, as well as a social and political, organization. As in pagan, pre-Christian, priesthoods, the kingly function was hereditary, this practice carrying over to Christian times. The king was elected by the tuath from within a royal kin-group (the derbfine), which carried the hereditary priestly function.Politically, however, the king had strictly limited functions: he was the military leader of the tuath, and he presided over the tuath assemblies. But he could only conduct war or peace negotiations as agent of the assemblies; and he was in no sense sovereign and had no rights of administering justice over tuath members. He could not legislate, and when he himself was party to a lawsuit, he had to submit his case to an independent judicial arbiter. 
Again, how, then, was law developed and justice maintained? In the first place, the law itself was based on a body of ancient and immemorial custom, passed down as oral and then written tradition through a class of professional jurists called the brehons. The brehons were in no sense public, or governmental, officials; they were simply selected by parties to disputes on the basis of their reputations for wisdom, knowledge of the customary law, and the integrity of their decisions. As Professor Peden states: 
…the professional jurists were consulted by parties to disputes for advice as to what the law was in particular cases, and these same men often acted as arbitrators between suitors. They remained at all times private persons, not public officials; their functioning depended upon their knowledge of the law and the integrity of their judicial reputations. 
Furthermore, the brehons had no connection whatsoever with the individual tuatha or with their kings. They were completely private, national in scope, and were used by disputants throughout Ireland. Moreover, and this is a vital point, in contrast to the system of private Roman lawyers, thebrehon was all there was; there were no other judges, no “public” judges of any kind, in ancient Ireland. 
It was the brehons who were schooled in the law, and who added glosses and applications to the law to fit changing conditions. Furthermore, there was no monopoly, in any sense, of the brehon jurists; instead, several competing schools of jurisprudence existed and competed for the custom of the Irish people. 
How were the decisions of the brehons enforced? Through an elaborate, voluntarily developed system of “insurance,” or sureties. Men were linked together by a variety of surety relationships by which they guaranteed one another for the righting of wrongs, and for the enforcement of justice and the decisions of the brehons. In short, the brehons themselves were not involved in the enforcement of decisions, which rested again with private individuals linked through sureties. There were various types of surety. For example, the surety would guarantee with his own property the payment of a debt, and then join the plaintiff in enforcing a debt judgment if the debtor refused to pay. In that case, the debtor would have to pay double damages: one to the original creditor, and another as compensation to his surety. And this system applied to all offences, aggressions and assaults as well as commercial contracts; in short, it applied to all cases of what we would call “civil” and “criminal” law. All criminals were considered to be “debtors” who owed restitution and compensation to their victims, who thus became their “creditors.” The victim would gather his sureties around him and proceed to apprehend the criminal or to proclaim his suit publicly and demand that the defendant submit to adjudication of their dispute with the brehons. The criminal might then send his own sureties to negotiate a settlement or agree to submit the dispute to the brehons. If he did not do so, he was considered an “outlaw” by the entire community; he could no longer enforce any claim of his own in the courts, and he was treated to the opprobrium of the entire community. 
There were occasional “wars,” to be sure, in the thousand years of Celtic Ireland, but they were minor brawls, negligible compared to the devastating wars that racked the rest of Europe. As Professor Peden points out, “without the coercive apparatus of the State which can through taxation and conscription mobilize large amounts of arms and manpower, the Irish were unable to sustain any large scale military force in the field for any length of time. Irish wars…were pitiful brawls and cattle raids by European standards.” 
Thus, we have indicated that it is perfectly possible, in theory and historically, to have efficient and courteous police, competent and learned judges, and a body of systematic and socially accepted law — and none of these things being furnished by a coercive government. Government — claiming a compulsory monopoly of protection over a geographical area, and extracting its revenues by force — can be separated from the entire field of protection. Government is no more necessary for providing vital protection service than it is necessary for providing anything else. And we have not stressed a crucial fact about government: that its compulsory monopoly over the weapons of coercion has led it, over the centuries, to infinitely more butcheries and infinitely greater tyranny and oppression than any decentralized, private agencies could possibly have done. If we look at the black record of mass murder, exploitation, and tyranny levied on society by governments over the ages, we need not be loath to abandon the Leviathan State and…try freedom. (pp. 231-234)
I am not saying that the Irish society was a flawless society, as it was marred with paganism before St. Patrick came, and neither am I claiming that a libertarian and stateless society will be a flawless utopia. But what I am saying is that the stateless society is practical and moral, and that it should be worth striving for.